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The recent worldwide economic crisis has brought renewed attention to the question of the usefulness of government spending as a way of stimulating aggregate eco-
nomic activity and employment during a slump. Interest in fiscal stimulus as an option 
has been greatly increased by the fact that in many countries, by the end of 2008, the 
short-term nominal interest rate used as the main operating target for monetary policy 
had reached zero—or at any rate, some very low value regarded as an effective lower 
bound by the central bank in question—so that further interest rate cuts were no longer 
available to stave off spiraling unemployment and fears of economic collapse. Increases 
in government spending were at least a dimension on which it was possible for govern-
ments to do more—but how effective should this be expected to be as a remedy?
Much public discussion of this issue has been based on old-fashioned models 
(both Keynesian and anti-Keynesian) that take little account of the role of intertem-
poral optimization and expectations in the determination of aggregate economic 
activity. This paper, instead, reviews the implications for this question of the kind 
of New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that are 
now commonly used in monetary policy analysis. It focuses on one specific question 
of current interest: the determinants of the size of the effect on aggregate output of 
an increase in government purchases, or what has been known since John Maynard 
Keynes (1936) as the government expenditure “multiplier.”
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Simple Analytics of the  
Government Expenditure Multiplier†
By Michael Woodford*
This paper explains the key factors that determine the output mul-
tiplier of government purchases in New Keynesian models, through 
a series of simple examples that can be solved analytically. Sticky 
prices or wages allow for larger multipliers than in a neoclassical 
model, though the size of the multiplier depends crucially on the 
monetary policy response. A multiplier well in excess of  one is pos-
sible when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound, 
and in this case welfare increases if government purchases expand 
to partially fill the output gap that arises from the inability to lower 
interest rates. (JEL E12, E23, E32, E62, H20, H50)
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I discuss this issue in the context of a series of models that are each simple enough 
for the effects to be computed analytically, so that the consequences of parameter 
variation for the quantitative results will be completely clear. It is hoped that the 
economic mechanisms behind the various results will be fairly transparent as well. 
I also restrict my attention to policy experiments that are defined in such a way that 
the time path of the increase in output has the same shape as the time path of the 
increase in government purchases, so that there is a clear meaning to the calculation 
of a “multiplier” (though more generally this need not be the case). These models 
are too simple to be taken seriously as the basis for quantitative estimates of the 
effects of some actually contemplated policy change; nonetheless, I believe that 
the mechanisms displayed in these simple examples explain many of the numeri-
cal results obtained by a variety of recent authors in the context of empirical New 
Keynesian DSGE models,1 and the simpler analysis here may be of pedagogical 
value.
I begin by reviewing in Section I the neoclassical benchmark under which 
intertemporal optimization should result in a multiplier less than one. Section II 
then shows that in simple New Keynesian models, if monetary policy maintains 
a constant real interest rate, the multiplier is instead equal to one. Section III 
shows that under more realistic assumptions about monetary policy under nor-
mal circumstances, the multiplier will be less than one, because real interest rates 
will increase; but Section IV shows that when the zero lower bound is a binding 
constraint on monetary policy, the multiplier is instead greater than one, because 
fiscal expansion should cause the real interest rate to fall. Section V considers the 
welfare effects of government purchases in these various cases, while Section VI 
briefly discusses the consequences of allowing for tax distortions. Section VII 
summarizes the paper’s conclusions.
I.  A Neoclassical Benchmark
I shall begin by reviewing the argument that government purchases necessarily 
crowd out private expenditure (at least to some extent), according to a neoclassi-
cal general-equilibrium model in which wages and prices are both assumed to be 
perfectly flexible. This provides a useful benchmark, relative to which I shall wish 
to discuss the consequences of allowing for wage or price rigidity. I shall confine 
my analysis here to a relatively special case of the neoclassical model, first ana-
lyzed by Robert J. Barro and Robert G. King (1984), though the result that the 
multiplier for government purchases is less than one does not require such special 
assumptions.2
1 See, for example, comments below on the studies of Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio 
Rebelo (2009); John F. Cogan et al. (2010); Thorsten Drautzburg and Harald Uhlig (2010); Christopher J. Erceg 
and Jesper Lindé (2010).
2 More general expositions of the neoclassical theory include Barro (1989); S. Rao Aiyagari, Christiano, and 
Eichenbaum (1992); and Marianne Baxter and King (1993).
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A. A competitive Economy
Consider an economy made up of a large number of identical, infinite-lived 




	 	β	t [u(	c	t )	−	 v(	H	t )]	,
where  c	t is the quantity consumed in period t of the economy’s single produced 
good,  H	t is hours of labor supplied in period t, the period utility functions satisfy 
u′ 	>	0, u″ 	<	0, v′ 	>	0, v″ 	>	0, and the discount factor satisfies 0	<	β	<	1. The 
good is produced using a production technology yielding output 
(2)  y	t 	 =	 f ( H	t ),
where  f  ′ 	>	0, f  ″ 	<	0. This output is consumed either by households or by the gov-
ernment, so that in equilibrium 
(3)  y	t 	 =	 	c	t 	 +	 	G	t 
each period. I shall begin by considering the perfect foresight equilibrium of a purely 
deterministic economy; the alternative fiscal policies considered will correspond to 
alternative deterministic sequences for the path of government purchases { G	t }. I 
shall also simplify (until Section VI) by assuming that government purchases are 
financed through lump-sum taxation; a change in the path of government purchases 
is assumed to imply a change in the path of tax collections so as to maintain inter-
temporal government solvency. (The exact timing of the path of tax collections is 
irrelevant in the case of lump-sum taxes, in accordance with the standard argument 
for “Ricardian equivalence.”)
One of the requirements for competitive equilibrium in this model is that in any 
period
(4)   v′ (	H	t )	_	u′ (	c	t ) 	=	 	
	W	t  _		p	t   .
This is a requirement for optimal labor supply by the representative household, 
where  W	t is the nominal wage in period t, and  p	t is the price of the good. Another 
requirement is that 
(5)  f  ′ ( H	t )	=	 		W	t  _		p	t   .
This is a requirement for profit-maximizing labor demand by the representa-
tive firm. In order for these conditions to simultaneously be true, one must have 
 v′ /	u′ 	=		f  ′ at each point in time.
Using (2) to substitute for  H	t and (3) to substitute for  c	t in this relation, one 
obtains an equilibrium condition 
(6)  u′ ( y	t 	 −	 	G	t )	=	 	˜  v′( y	t )
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in which  y	t is the only endogenous variable. Here,  ˜  v(y )	≡	v(		f 	−1 (y )) is the disutility 
to the representative household of supplying a quantity of output y, so that  ˜  v	′	=		v ′ /	f  ′ .(Note that our previous assumptions imply that  ˜  v	′	>	0,  ˜  v	′′	>	0.) This is also obvi-
ously the first-order condition for the planning problem of choosing  y	t to maximize 
utility, given preferences, technology, and the level of government purchases. Thus, 
this equilibrium condition reflects the familiar result that competitive equilibrium 
maximizes the welfare of the representative household (in the case that there is a 
representative household).
Condition (6) can be solved for equilibrium output  y	t as a function of  G	t . 
Differentiation of the function implicitly defined by (6) yields a formula for the 
“multiplier,” 
(7)  dy _	
dG
 =	 	 	η	u  _		η	u 	 +	 	η	v   ,
where  η	u 	>	0 is the negative of the elasticity of  u′ and  η	v 	>	0 is the elasticity of  ˜  v	′	 
with respect to increases in y.3 It follows that the multiplier is positive, but neces-
sarily less than one. This means that private expenditure (here, entirely modeled as 
nondurable consumer expenditure) is necessarily crowded out, at least partially, by 
government purchases. In the case that the degree of intertemporal substitutabil-
ity of private expenditure is high (so that  η	u is small), while the marginal cost of 
employing additional resources in production is sharply rising (so	that  η	v is large), 
the multiplier may be only a small fraction of one.
B. Monopolistic competition
The mere existence of some degree of market power in either product or labor 
markets does not much change this result. Suppose, for example, that instead of 
a single good there is a large number of differentiated goods, each with a single 
monopoly producer; and, as in the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic 
competition, let us suppose that the representative household’s preferences are again 
of the form (1), but that  c	t is now a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregate of 
the household’s purchases of each of the differentiated goods, 
(8)  c	t ≡	 	[	∫	
0
1
	 	c	t (i )		θ−1 _	θ	 	di] 		 θ	_	θ−1   ,
where  c	t (i) is the quantity purchased of good i, and θ	>	1 is the elasticity of substi-
tution among differentiated goods. Let us suppose for simplicity that each good is 
produced using a common production function of the form (2), with a single homoge-
neous labor input used in producing all goods. In this model, each producer will face a 
downward-sloping demand curve for its product, with elasticity θ; profit maximization 
will then require not production to the point where marginal cost is equal to the price 
3 That is,  η	u ≡	−		_	y u″ /	u′ ,  η	v ≡	_	y ˜  v	′′/	˜  v	′.
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for which it sells its good, but only to the point at which the price of good i is equal to 
μ times marginal cost, where the desired markup factor is given by 
(9)	 μ	≡	 	 θ	_	θ	−	 1  >	 1.
Hence, condition (5) must be replaced by the requirement that  p	t (i)	=	μ	W	t /	f ′ (	h	t (i)) 
for each good i.
Let us consider a monopolistically competitive equilibrium, in which each firm 
chooses its price optimally, taking as given the wage and the demand curve that it 
faces. (I continue to assume perfectly flexible prices, and a competitive labor market 
or some other form of efficient labor contracting.) Since each firm faces the same 
wage and a demand curve of the same form, in equilibrium each firm chooses the 
same price, hires the same amount of labor, and produces the same quantity. It fol-
lows that we must also have 
(10)  p	t 	 =	 μ	W	t /	f ′ ( H	t ),
where  p	t is the common price of all goods (and also the price of the composite 
good), and  H	t is the common quantity of labor hired by each firm (and also the 
aggregate hours worked). It also follows that aggregate output  y	t (in units of the 
composite good) and aggregate hours worked  H	t must again satisfy (2). Optimal 
labor supply by the representative household also continues to require that (4) hold, 
where  p	t is now the price of the composite good.
Relations (2), (4), and (10) allow us to derive a simple generalization of equation 
(6), 
(11)  u′ ( y	t 	 −	 	G	t )	=	 μ	˜  v′( y	t ),
which again suffices to determine equilibrium output as a function of the current 
level of government purchases. While the equilibrium level of output is no longer 
efficient, the multiplier is still given by (7), regardless of the value of μ. A similar 
conclusion is obtained in the case of a constant markup of wages relative to house-
holds’ marginal rate of substitution: aggregate output is again determined by (11), 
where μ is now an “efficiency wedge” that depends on the degree of market power in 
both product and labor markets, and so the multiplier calculation remains the same.4
A different result can be obtained, however, if the size of the efficiency wedge 
is endogenous. One of the most obvious sources of such endogeneity is delay in 
the adjustment of wages or prices to changing market conditions.5 If prices are not 
immediately adjusted in full proportion to the increase in marginal cost resulting 
4 The same result is obtained in the case of a constant rate of taxation or subsidization of labor income, firms’ 
payrolls, consumption spending, or firms’ revenues. The tax distortions simply change the size of the efficiency 
wedge μ in equation (11).
5 Another possible source of endogeneity is cyclical variation in desired markups due to implicit collusion, 
as in the model of Julio J. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). In that model, a temporary increase in government 
purchases reduces the ability of oligopolistic producers to maintain collusion; the resulting decline in markups 
increases equilibrium output more than would occur in a perfectly competitive model.
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from an increase in government purchases, the right-hand side of (10) will increase 
more than does the left-hand side; as a consequence, the right-hand side of (11) 
will increase more than does the left-hand side of that expression. This implies an 
increase in  y	t greater than the one implied by (11). One can similarly show that if 
wages are not immediately adjusted in full proportion to the increase in the marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, the right-hand side of (11) 
will increase more than does the left-hand side, again implying a larger multiplier 
than the one given in (7).
Hence, the key to obtaining a larger multiplier is an endogenous decline in the 
labor-efficiency wedge.6 In a model with sticky prices or wages, however, the degree 
to which the efficiency wedge changes depends on the degree to which aggregate 
demand differs from what it was expected to be when prices and wages were set. 
Equilibrium output is thus no longer determined solely by supply-side consider-
ations; we must, instead, consider the effects of government purchases on aggregate 
demand.
II.  A New Keynesian Benchmark
What is the size of the government expenditure multiplier if prices or wages are 
sticky—as many empirical DSGE models posit, in order to account for the observed 
effects of monetary policy on real activity? The answer does not depend solely on 
the assumed structure of the economy. If prices or wages are sticky, monetary policy 
affects real activity, and so the consequences of an increase in government pur-
chases depend on the monetary policy response. One might suppose that the ques-
tion of interest should be the effects of government purchases “leaving monetary 
policy unchanged;” but one must take care to specify just what is assumed to be 
unchanged. It is not the same thing to assume that the path of the money supply is 
unchanged as to assume that the path of interest rates is unchanged, or that the cen-
tral bank’s inflation target is unchanged, or that the central bank continues to adhere 
to a “Taylor rule,” to list only a few of the possibilities.
I shall first consider, as a useful benchmark, a policy experiment in which it is 
assumed that the central bank maintains an unchanged path for the real interest 
rate, regardless of the path of government purchases. This case corresponds, essen-
tially, to the standard “multiplier” calculation in undergraduate textbooks, where the 
question asked is how much the “IS curve” shifts to the right—that is, how much 
output would be increased if the real interest rate were not to change. Here, I wish 
to consider a similar question, but in a dynamic model, it is necessary to define the 
hypothetical policy in terms of the entire forward path of the real interest rate. The 
answer to this question provides a useful benchmark for two reasons. The first is that 
it is simple to calculate; but the second is that the answer is the same under a wide 
range of alternative assumptions about the nature of price or wage stickiness.
Again, I consider a purely deterministic economy, and let the path of government 
purchases be given by a sequence { G	t }, such that  G	t →  _	G for large t; the long-run 
6  Robert E. Hall (2009) says that the key is a decline in the price markup; but this is not the only possibility, as 
is discussed further at the end of Section II.
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level of government purchases  
_	G is held constant while considering alternative pos-
sible assumptions about near-term government purchases. Thus, I shall consider 
only the consequences of temporary variations in the level of government purchases. 
I shall furthermore assume that monetary policy brings about a zero rate of inflation 
in the long run. (That is, the inflation rate { π	t } is also a deterministic sequence, such 
that  π	t →	0 for large t.) Under quite weak assumptions about the nature of wage and 
price adjustment, these assumptions about monetary and fiscal policy in the long run 
imply that the economy converges asymptotically to a steady state in which govern-
ment purchases equal  
_	G each period, inflation is equal to zero, and output is equal 
to some constant level  
_	y .7
Given preferences (1), optimization by households requires that, in equilibrium, 
(12)   u′ (	c	t )	_	β	u′ (	c	t+1 )	 =	 	e	
	r	t  
each period, where  r	t is the (continuously compounded) real rate of return between t 
and t	+	1. It follows from (12) that in the long-run steady state,  r	t 	=		_	r  ≡	−	logβ	>	0 
each period. Since I wish to consider a monetary policy that maintains a constant 
real rate of interest, regardless of the temporary variation in government purchases, 
it is necessary to assume that monetary policy maintains  r	t 	=		_	r  for all t; this is the 
only constant real interest rate consistent with the assumption of asymptotic conver-
gence to a long-run steady state.
We may suppose that the central bank chooses an operating target for the nominal 
interest rate  i	t according to a Taylor rule of the form 
(13)  i	t 	 =	 	_	i t 	 +	 	ϕ	π	π	t 	 +	 	ϕ	y log( y	t /		_	y ),
where the response coefficients  ϕ	π	, ϕ	y are chosen so as to imply a determinate equi-
librium under this policy,8 and where the sequence { _	i t } is chosen so that  _	i t →  _	r 
for large t (the requirement for asymptotic convergence to the zero-inflation steady 
state) and so that the equilibrium determined by this monetary policy involves  r	t 	=		_	r 
each period. However, there is no need to assume that the equilibrium is imple-
mented in this way; all that matters for the analysis here is that a monetary policy 
can be specified that implements the equilibrium in which the real interest rate is 
constant.
Let us set aside for the moment the question whether such an equilibrium exists 
(and what sort of monetary policy implements it), and consider what such an 
equilibrium must be like if it exists. If  r	t 	=		_	r  for all t, it follows from (12) that 
 c	t 	=		c	t+1 for all t. Thus, the representative household must be planning a constant 
level of consumption over the indefinite future, at whatever level is consistent with 
its intertemporal budget constraint. Convergence to the steady state referred to above 
7 Under many reasonable assumptions about wage and price adjustment, the steady-state level of output  
_	y will 
be the same as in the model with flexible wages and prices, namely, the solution to (11) when  G	t 	=		_	G .
8 See Woodford (2003, Proposition 4.3) for the conditions required in the case of the Calvo model of price 
adjustment described in Section III. In general, the precise conditions for determinacy of equilibrium will depend 
on the details of wage and price adjustment.
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implies that  c	t →  _	c ≡  _	y −		_	G for large t; hence, equilibrium must involve  c	t 	=		_	c 
for all t.9 It then follows from (3) that 
(14)  y	t 	 =	 	_	c +	 	G	t 
for all t. Hence, in this case, we find once again that equilibrium output depends 
only on the level of government purchases in the current period—so that the effects 
of a given size increase in government purchases are the same regardless of how 
persistent the increase is expected to be10—but now the multiplier (d y	t /d G	t ) is equal 
to one. There is no crowding out of private expenditure by government purchases, 
though no stimulus of additional private expenditure, either.11
An interesting feature of this simple result is that it is quite independent of any 
very specific assumption about the dynamics of wage and price adjustment. Under 
the particular assumption about monetary policy made here, the effect on aggregate 
output depends purely on the demand side of the model. The supply side of the 
model matters only in solving for the implied path of inflation, wages, and employ-
ment, and for the monetary policy required to achieve the hypothesized path of real 
interest rates. I have, however, made one crucial assumption about the supply side. I 
have supposed that it is possible for monetary policy to maintain  r	t 	=		_	r  at all times, 
regardless of the chosen short-run path of government purchases. This assumption 
is violated by the model with fully flexible wages and prices. However, under many 
specifications of sticky prices or wages (or both), it is possible for monetary policy 
to affect real interest rates, and a path for monetary policy can be chosen under 
which  r	t 	=		_	r  will hold, in the case of any path for government purchases satisfying 
certain bounds.
Essentially, it is simply necessary to use the model of wage and price adjustment 
implied by such a model to determine the paths of wages and prices implied by the 
dynamics of consumption and output solved for above. Assuming that a solution 
exists, the implied path for inflation, and hence for inflation expectations, will then 
yield the required path of the nominal interest rate. (Adjoining a money-demand 
equation to the model would then allow one to determine the required path of the 
money supply as well.) In the next section, I present the equations of a particular 
familiar model of price adjustment (the model with flexible wages and Calvo-style 
staggered adjustment of prices), and show how it is possible to determine the mone-
tary policy required to keep the real interest rate constant in that model. But it should 
be evident that the conclusion that some monetary policy would be consistent with 
a constant real rate is in no way dependent on the special details of the Calvo model 
9 This is the point at which it matters to the argument that I consider only paths for government purchases such that 
c t →		_	c . In the case of a change in the long-run level of government purchases, the long-run steady-state value  _	c 
would also change.
10 This statement is subject to the proviso, of course, that the long-run level of government purchases,  
_	G , is not 
changed. If the short-run increase in  G	t actually implies that government purchases will have to be reduced in the 
long run, then consumption will increase, and the multiplier will be greater than one, as concluded by Giancarlo 
Corsetti, André Meier, and Gernot J. Müller (2009).
11 It is possible, instead, to obtain an increase in private expenditure, and hence a multiplier greater than one, if 
household preferences are nonseparable between consumption and leisure, as discussed by Tommaso Monacelli and 
Roberto Perotti (2010) and Florin Ovidiu Bilbiie (2009).
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of price adjustment; it is equally true in many other models of the dynamics of price 
adjustment, in models with sticky wages instead of (or in addition to) sticky prices, 
in models with “sticky information” instead of sticky prices, and so on.
It may seem surprising that the multiplier in this baseline case is independent of 
the degree of flexibility of prices and wages. There thus appears to be a discontinu-
ity in the case of complete flexibility (and full information), where the multiplier is 
given by (7). The explanation is that the derivation of (14) requires that it be pos-
sible for monetary policy to maintain a constant real interest rate despite an increase 
in government purchases; and while such a policy is technically possible, according 
to the model of price adjustment presented in Section IIIA, for any positive degree 
of price stickiness, as the degree of price stickiness becomes small, the required 
degree of inflation becomes extreme. Hence, it becomes implausible to believe that a 
central bank will actually maintain a constant real interest rate (even if this is techni-
cally feasible) in the case of sufficiently flexible (even though not perfectly flexible) 
prices. For this reason, the relevance of the New Keynesian benchmark does depend 
on the existence of a sufficient degree of stickiness of prices, wages, or information 
(or more than one of these).
It is also noteworthy that, in this benchmark case, the predicted multiplier is inde-
pendent of the degree to which resource utilization is slack; in the derivation of (14), 
the costs of supplying a given level of output do not figure at all. But once again, 
supply costs do generally matter for the rate of inflation associated with a given size 
of government purchases under the assumed monetary policy; more steeply increas-
ing marginal costs as output increases will lead to larger price increases. Again, this 
means that it is much more plausible to imagine a central bank holding real interest 
rates constant in response to an increase in government purchases when there is a 
great deal of excess capacity (so that marginal cost increases little with increased 
output), rather than when capacity utilization is high (so that marginal cost is steeply 
increasing).	And if capacity constraints are severe enough, it may actually be infea-
sible to maintain a constant real interest rate under any monetary policy, because no 
amount of monetary stimulus can induce the increase in supply required in order for 
the current goods not to be expensive relative to future goods (or indexed bonds).
The simple case considered in this section suffices to establish that New 
Keynesian models can easily deliver multipliers higher than the one predicted by the 
neoclassical model. This makes them easier to reconcile with empirical evidence. 
For example, Hall’s (2009) review of the empirical evidence concludes that “GDP 
rises by roughly the amount of an increase in government purchases” under normal 
circumstances,12 which is to say that the multiplier is roughly one. While this is too 
large an effect to be consistent with neoclassical theory, at least in standard models, 
it is easily consistent with a simple New Keynesian model, to the extent that mon-
etary policy has in fact maintained a relatively constant real interest rate in response 
to fiscal shocks.13 (The response of the real interest rate to fiscal shocks is seldom 
12 He notes that the multiplier may be substantially larger when monetary policy is constrained by the zero 
bound. This special case is discussed in Section IV.
13 Under some familiar hypotheses about monetary policy, such as the Taylor rule, the New Keynesian model 
would predict a smaller multiplier, as is discussed in Section III. However, authors such as John B. Taylor (1999) 
and Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler (2000) argue that US monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s 
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considered in the literature that Hall (2009) reviews; this is a topic that deserves 
further attention.)
Hall (2009) argues that while New Keynesian models can explain the possibil-
ity of a multiplier on the order of one, they can do so only under the hypothesis 
of countercyclical movement in the markup of prices relative to marginal cost, and 
he questions the realism of the latter assumption, citing evidence such as the find-
ings of Christopher J. Nekarda and Valerie A. Ramey (2010). Nekarda and Ramey 
(2010) find that increases in government purchases have little effect on their measure 
of the markup (the ratio of average labor productivity to the real wage). However, 
New Keynesian models do not necessarily imply that this measure of the markup 
must decline in response to an increase in government purchases; the real wage may 
remain constant, or even fall, if wages are sticky, while average labor productivity 
may remain constant, or even increase, in the presence of overhead labor or procycli-
cal effort (to cite only two familiar hypotheses). Yet, hypotheses of these types, which 
are consistent with the Nekarda-Ramey findings, are also consistent with the reason-
ing given above; under the hypothesis of a central bank that maintains the path of real 
interest rates fixed despite the increase in government purchases, the multiplier will 
equal one. Hence, Hall’s (2009) critique of the basic mechanism that allows New 
Keynesian models to predict multipliers of this size seems to be misplaced.
III.  Alternative Degrees of Monetary Accommodation
The result obtained in the previous section applies only under one specific assump-
tion about monetary policy, namely, that the path of the real interest rate will remain 
fixed despite the temporary increase in government purchases. Under alternative 
assumptions about the degree of monetary accommodation of the fiscal stimulus, 
the size of the increase in output will be different. Indeed, under some assumptions 
about monetary policy, the output response predicted by the New Keynesian model 
may be even smaller than in the neoclassical model. Hence, an empirical finding of 
a multiplier less than one, under the monetary policy that has been followed histori-
cally, does not necessarily disconfirm the validity of the New Keynesian model.
In order to illustrate this point by computing multipliers associated with alterna-
tive monetary policies, it is necessary to adopt a specific model of wage and price 
adjustment. The calculations in this section and the one that follows are based on 
a particular, very familiar New Keynesian model, in which wages are flexible and 
prices adjust according to the Calvo model of staggered price adjustment.
A. inflation dynamics and Aggregate Supply: A Simple Model
Let us assume Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, as discussed in Section I, 
but now let us suppose that each differentiated good i is produced using a constant-
returns-to-scale technology of the form 
was considerably more “passive” than the Taylor rule would prescribe, allowing the real interest rate to fall in 
response to increases in inflation, and it is possible that the fiscal multipliers found in the empirical literature mainly 
reflect responses from such periods.
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(15)  y	t (i)	=	 	k	t (i)	f ( h	t (i)/ k	t (i)),
where  k	t (i) is the quantity of capital goods used in production by firm i,  h	t (i) are 
the hours of labor hired by the firm, and f (⋅) is the same increasing, concave func-
tion as before. I shall assume for simplicity that the total supply of capital goods is 
exogenously given (and can be normalized to equal one), but that capital goods are 
allocated to firms each period through a competitive rental market. This assumption 
implies that each firm will have a common marginal cost of production, a homoge-
neous degree 1 function of the two competitive factor prices that is independent of 
the firm’s chosen scale of production.
Cost-minimization will imply that each firm chooses the same labor/capital ratio, 
regardless of its scale of production, and in equilibrium this common labor/capital 
ratio will equal  H	t , the aggregate labor supply (recalling that aggregate capital is 
equal to one). Hence, the common nominal marginal cost of production  S	t in any 
period will equal 
(16)  S	t 	 =	 	W	t /	f ′ ( H	t ).
If we assume flexible wages and a competitive labor market, (4) must again hold in 
equilibrium; substituting this for  W	t in (16) yields 
(17)  S	t 	 =	 	p	t   ˜  v′(	f (	H	t ))	_		u′(	y	t 	 −	 	G	t )	.
Note that in the case that each firm’s price is a fixed markup μ over marginal cost 
(as would follow from Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition with flexible prices), 
condition (17) together with (2) would imply that output must satisfy (11), as con-
cluded previously.
In the Calvo model of staggered price adjustment, it is assumed that fraction 
1	−	α of all firms reconsider their prices in any given period, while the others con-
tinue to charge the same price as in the previous period. (The probability that any 
firm will reconsider its price in any period is assumed to be independent of the time 
since it last reconsidered its price, and of how high or low its current price may 
be.) To a log-linear approximation,14 the optimal price  p	t	∗	 chosen by each firm that 
reconsiders its price in period t will be given by15 
(18) log  p	t	∗	 =	 log μ	+	 	∑	
j=0
∞
	 	(1	 −	 αβ)	α	j β	j 	E	t [log S	t+j ].
14 Here, I log-linearize around the zero-inflation steady state, which under the assumed monetary policy is the 
equilibrium in the case that government purchases equal  
_	G each period. Hence, the approximation is valid if in all 
periods  G	t remains close enough to  _	G . Further details of the calculation sketched here are presented in Woodford (2003, chap. 3).
15 Here, I write the condition in the more general form that applies in the case of a stochastic environment, as 
preparation for further applications below.
12 AMEricAN EcoNoMic JourNAL: MAcroEcoNoMicS JANuAry 2011
(This is just a weighted geometric average of the prices  p	t+j	f  =	μ	S	t+j that a profit-
maximizing flexible-price firm would choose in each of the future periods t	+	j.)
Since in each period, a fraction (1	−	α)	α	j of all firms chose their current price j 
periods earlier (for each j	≥	0), in a similar log-linear approximation the price index 
evolves according to a law of motion 
(19) log  p	t 	 =	 αlog  p	t−1 	 +	 (1	 −	 α)log  p	t	∗	.
Condition (19) together with (18) allow one to show that 
(20) log (	 p	t	∗	/	p	t )	=	 (1	 −	 αβ)	∑	
j=0
∞
	 	β	j 	E	t [logμ	+	 log  S	t+j 	 −	 log  p	t+j ].
Thus, a firm that reconsiders its price will choose a high relative price, to the 
extent that a weighted geometric average of the profit-maximizing relative prices 
μ	S	t+j /	p	t+j in the various future periods t	+	j is high. In the case of fully flexible 
prices,  p	t must equal  p	t	∗	 each period, in which case (20) requires that  p	t 	=	μ	S	t each 
period, leading again to (11). But with sticky prices, it is possible for  p	t to differ 
from μ	S	t (and hence for  y	t to violate equation (11)); this simply requires that firms 
that reconsider their prices choose a price different from the general level of prices 
(	 p	t	∗	≠		p	t ), resulting in inflation or deflation (	p	t ≠	pt−1) in accordance with (19).
A similar log-linear approximation to (17) takes the form16 
(21) log( S	t /	p	t )	=	−	logμ	+	 	η	v  y	t 	 +	 	η	u (  y	t 	 −	 	 G 	t ),
where the elasticities  η	v , η	u 	>	0 are defined as in (7), and the deviations from
steady state are defined as   y	t ≡	log(	y	t /		_	y ),   G 	t ≡	(	G	t 	−		_	G )/		_	y . 17 Hence, an increase 
in   y	t greater than the one implied by the flexible-price multiplier (7) requires that 
real marginal cost  S	t /	p	t increases. Substituting this into (20), we obtain 
(22) log( p	t	∗	/	p	t )	=	 (1	 −	 αβ)( η	u 	 +	 	η	v )	∑	
j=0
∞
	 	β	j 		E	t [  y	t+j 	 −	 Γ	 G 	t+j ],
where Γ	<	1 is the flexible-price multiplier defined in (7). Then, since (19) implies 
that the inflation rate is given by 
(23)	 	π	t ≡	 log( p	t /	p	t−1 )	=	 	1	 −	 α	_α	 	log( p	t	∗	/	p	t ),
16 Note that because the steady state around which the approximation is computed involves the same level of 
production of each good, log-linearization of (15) and integration over i implies that, to this order of approxima-
tion, the aggregate quantities  y	t and  H	t satisfy (2). This allows an expression to be derived for real marginal cost as 
a function of   y	t and   G 	t only.
17 The latter definition is chosen so that   G 	t is defined even if  _	G =	0, and so that   G 	t and   y	t are in comparable units (i.e., percentages of steady-state output).
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we obtain 
(24)	 	π	t 	 =	 κ	∑	
j=0
∞
	 	β	j 	E	t [  y	t+j 	 −	 Γ	 G 	t+j ],
where κ	≡	(1	−	α)(1	−	αβ)(	η	u 	+		η	v )/α	>	0. 
We can now answer the question whether it is possible for monetary policy 
to maintain a constant real interest rate in the case of an arbitrary path { G	t } for 
government purchases, at least in the case that  G	t remains always close enough 
to  
_	G for the log-linear approximation to be accurate. For an arbitrary path { G	t }, the 
solution for the path of output { y	t } is given by (14). Substituting this into (24), one 
obtains a solution for the path of the inflation rate as well.18 It is then straightforward 
to solve for the equilibrium path of the nominal interest rate, and for the path {		_	i t } of 
intercepts for the central bank reaction function (13). One thus obtains a policy that 
implements the equilibrium conjectured in Section II.
B. A Strict inflation Target
As an example of another simple hypothesis about monetary policy, suppose that 
the central bank maintains a strict inflation target, regardless of the path of govern-
ment purchases. (For conformity with the assumption made above about the long-
run steady state, suppose that the inflation target is zero.) In the case of the Calvo 
model of price adjustment, (23) implies that maintaining a zero inflation rate each 
period requires that  p	t	∗	=		p	t each period. It then follows from (20) that this requires 
that μ	S	t 	=		p	t each period.19 If we assume flexible wages (or efficient labor con-
tracting), (17) implies that this will hold if and only if  y	t satisfies (11) each period. 
Hence, under this policy, aggregate output  y	t will be the same function of  G	t as in 
the case of flexible prices, and the multiplier will be given by (7).
Again, this result does not depend on the precise details of the Calvo model of 
price adjustment. In a wide range of specifications with sticky prices (or prices set 
on the basis of sticky information), a sufficient (and often necessary) condition for 
zero inflation each period is maintenance of aggregate conditions under which the 
marginal cost of production satisfies  S	t 	=		p	t−1 /μ each period. For if this condition 
holds, then under the assumption that each firm that reconsiders its price at any date 
chooses  p	t	∗	=		p	t−1 , not only will all prices remain constant over time, but each firm 
will find that marginal revenue equals marginal cost each period, so that no firm 
would expect to increase profits by deviating from this pricing strategy. But such 
a policy thus ensures that each firm’s price is equal to μ	S	t each period, so that the 
equilibrium is the same as if all prices were fully flexible and set on the basis of full 
information. Hence, the multiplier will be given by (7), just as in the neoclassical 
model.
18 Note that for any bounded sequence {  G 	t }, the infinite sum is well defined.
19 One can show that this is true in the exact model, and not merely in the log-linear approximation used in (20).
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C. Monetary Accommodation under a Taylor rule
A less extreme hypothesis would assume that policy is not tightened so much in 
response to a fiscal expansion as to prevent any increase in prices, but that real inter-
est rates do rise in response to any increase in prices that occurs, rather than being 
held constant regardless of the consequences for inflation. For example, suppose 
that interest rates are set in accordance with a Taylor rule of the form 
(25)  i	t 	 =	 	_	r  +	 	ϕ	π	π	t 	 +	 	ϕ	y (  y	t 	 −	 Γ	 G 	t ),
where  i	t is a short-term riskless nominal rate (the central bank’s policy instrument), _	r  is the value of this rate in a steady state with zero inflation (so that the policy rule 
is consistent with that steady state), and the response coefficients satisfy  ϕ	π	>	1, ϕ	y 	>	0, as proposed by Taylor (1993). Here,   y	t 	−	Γ	 G 	t corresponds to one inter-
pretation of the “output gap,” namely, the number of percentage points by which 
aggregate output exceeds the flexible-price equilibrium level.
In order to determine the equilibrium implications of a policy rule of this kind, it 
is useful also to log-linearize equilibrium relation (12), yielding20 
(26)   y	t 	 −	 	 G 	t 	 =	 	E	t [  y	t+1 	 −	 	 G 	t+1 ]	 −	 σ( i	t 	 −	 	E	t  π	t+1 	 −	 	_	r  ),
where σ	≡		η	u	−1 	>	0 measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private 
expenditure.21 If we consider deterministic paths for government purchases of the 
simple form   G 	t 	=		 G 	0 ρ	t for some 0	≤	ρ	<	1, then the future path of government 
purchases looking forward from any date t is a time-invariant function of the level 
of   G 	t at that date. Conjecturing a solution of the form 
(27)   y	t 	 =	 	γ	y  G 	t ,
(28) 	π	t 	 =	 	γ	π		 G 	t ,
(29)  i	t 	 =	 	_	r  +	 	γ	i   G 	t ,
for some coefficients  γ	y ,  γ	π	,  γ	i , we can substitute these equations into (24), (25), 
and (26), and solve for the values of the coefficients for which all three equilibrium 
conditions are satisfied each period.
There is easily a unique solution of this form, in which 
(30)	 	γ	y 	 =	 	1	 −	 ρ	+	ψΓ		__1	 −	 ρ	+	ψ		,
20 Again, I write the log-linear approximation for the more general stochastic form of this equilibrium condition, 
as this will be used in the next section.
21 Here,  i	t is a continuously compounded nominal rate — that is,  i	t ≡	−	log Q	t , where  Q	t is the nominal price of 
a bond that pays one unit of currency with certainty in period t	+1 — and  _	r  ≡	−	logβ is the corresponding continu-
ously compounded rate of time preference.
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where 
	 ψ	≡	 σ	[	ϕ	y 	 +	 	 κ	_	1	 −	 βρ	(	ϕ	π	−	 ρ)]	>	 0.
It follows from (27) that in this case the multiplier is simply the coefficient  γ	y . One 
observes from (30) that under this policy, Γ	<		γ	y 	<	1. Thus, the multiplier is nec-
essarily higher than in the flexible-price model (or under the strict inflation target-
ing policy), but smaller than under the constant-real-interest rate policy. It is higher 
than under strict inflation targeting, because under the Taylor rule, inflation is allowed 
to rise somewhat in response to fiscal stimulus; but lower than under the constant-
real-interest-rate policy, because the real interest rate is increased in response to the 
increases in inflation and in the output gap. Note also that for a policy rule of this form, 
the size of the multiplier depends on the degree of stickiness of prices (through the 
dependence of ψ upon the value of κ); the more flexible are prices (i.e., the smaller the 
value of α), the larger is κ and hence ψ, and the smaller is the multiplier.
A still more realistic assumption about monetary policy might be to assume a 
Taylor rule of the form (13), but with a constant intercept. (I shall assume  _	i t =		_	r  , 
for consistency with the zero-inflation steady state.) In this case, the central bank 
is assumed to respond to deviations of aggregate output from its average (or trend) 
level, rather than to departures from the flexible-price equilibrium level. (In fact, 
most central banks use measures of potential output that do not assume that potential 
should depend on the level of government purchases, as in specification (25).) In 
this case, we again obtain a solution of the form (27)–(29), but with different con-
stant coefficients; the multiplier is now given by 
(31)	 	γ	y 	 =	 	1	 −	 ρ	+	 (ψ	−	 σ	ϕ	y )Γ			__1	 −	 ρ	+	ψ	 	.
The multiplier is necessarily smaller under this kind of Taylor rule, since (for any 
ϕ	y 	>	0) the degree to which monetary policy is tightened in response to expansion-
ary fiscal policy is necessarily greater. In fact, in the case of any large enough value 
of  ϕ	y , the multiplier under this kind of Taylor rule is even smaller than the one pre-
dicted by the neoclassical model. In such a case, price stickiness results in even less 
output increase than would occur with flexible prices, because the central bank’s 
reaction function raises real interest rates more than would occur with flexible prices 
(and more than is required to maintain zero inflation). Hence, while larger multipli-
ers are possible according to a New Keynesian model, they are predicted to occur 
only in the case of a sufficient degree of monetary accommodation of the increase in 
real activity; and, in general, this will also require the central bank to accommodate 
an increase in the rate of inflation.
IV.  Fiscal Stimulus at the Zero Interest Rate Lower Bound
One case in which it is especially plausible to suppose that the central bank 
will not tighten policy in response to an increase in government purchases is when 
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 monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on the short-term nominal 
interest rate. This is a case in which it is plausible to assume not merely that the real 
interest rate does not rise in response to fiscal stimulus, but that the nominal rate does 
not rise; this will actually be associated with a decrease in the real rate of interest, to 
the extent that the fiscal stimulus is associated with increased inflation expectations. 
Hence, government purchases should have an especially strong effect on aggregate 
output when the central bank’s policy rate is at the zero lower bound.22 This is also 
a case of particular interest, since calls for fiscal stimulus become more urgent when 
it is no longer possible to achieve as much stimulus to aggregate demand as would 
be desired through interest-rate cuts alone.
In practice, the zero lower bound is most likely to become a binding constraint on 
monetary policy when financial intermediation is severely disrupted, as during the 
Great Depression or the recent financial crisis.23 A simple extension of the model 
proposed above allows us to see how this can occur. Suppose that the interest rate 
that is relevant in condition (12) for the intertemporal allocation of expenditure 
is not the same as the central bank’s policy rate, and furthermore that the spread 
between the two interest rates varies over time, owing to changes in the efficiency of 
financial intermediation.24 If we let  i	t denote the policy rate, and  i	t 	+		Δ	t the interest 
rate that is relevant for the intertemporal allocation of expenditure, then (26) takes 
the more general form 
(32)   y	t 	 −	 	 G 	t 	 =	 	E	t [  y	t+1 	 −	 	 G 	t+1 ]	 −	 σ( i	t 	 −	 	E	t π	t+1 	 −	 	r	t	net ),
where  r	t	net ≡	−	log β	−		Δ	t is the real policy rate required to maintain a constant path 
for private expenditure (at the steady-state level). If the spread  Δ	t becomes large 
enough, for a period of time, as a result of a disturbance to the financial sector, then 
the value of  r	t	net may temporarily be negative. In such a case the zero lower bound 
on  i	t will make (32) incompatible, for example, with achievement of the steady state 
with zero inflation and government purchases equal to  
_	G in all periods.
A. A Two-State Example
As a simple example (based on Gauti B. Eggertsson 2009), suppose that under 
normal conditions,  r	t	net 	=		_	r  >	0, but that as a result of a financial disturbance at 
date 0, credit spreads increase, and  r	t	net falls to a value  r	L 	<	0. Suppose that each 
period thereafter, there is a probability 0	<	μ	<	1 that the elevated credit spreads 
persist in period t, and that  r	t	net continues to equal  r	L , if credit spreads were elevated 
in period t	−	1; but with probability 1	−	μ credit spreads return to their normal 
level, and  r	t	net 	=		_	r  . Once credit spreads return to normal, they remain at the normal 
22 In fact, it matters only that the policy rate be at a level that the central bank is unwilling to go below; this 
“effective lower bound” need not be zero.
23 See Christiano (2004) for a quantitative analysis of the conditions under which the zero bound would be a 
binding constraint even in the absence of financial frictions.
24 Vasco Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) present a complete general equilibrium model with credit frictions in 
which the policy rate is lower than the rate of interest that enters the equilibrium relation that generalizes (26), and 
describe a number of sources of variation in the spread between the two rates.
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level thereafter. (This exogenous evolution of the credit spread is assumed to be 
unaffected by either monetary or fiscal policy choices.)
Suppose, furthermore, that monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule, except 
that the interest rate target is set to zero if the linear rule would call for a negative 
rate; specifically, let us suppose that 
(33)  i	t 	 =	 	  			max	 	 {	_	r  +	 	ϕ	π	π	t 	 +	 	ϕ	y  y	t ,	0} ,
so that the rule would be consistent with the zero-inflation steady state, if  r	t	net were 
to equal  
_	r  at all times. (We shall again suppose that  ϕ	π	>	1,  ϕ	y 	>	0, as prescribed 
by Taylor.) Finally, let us consider fiscal policies under which government purchases 
are equal to some level  G	L for all 0	≤	t	<	T, where T is the random date at which 
credit spreads return to their normal level, and equal to  
_	G for all t	≥	T. The question 
we wish to consider is the effect of choosing a higher level of government purchases 
G	L during the crisis, taking as given the value of  _	G (the level of government pur-
chases during normal times) and the monetary policy rule (33).
Since there is no further uncertainty from date T onward, and the equilibrium 
conditions (24), (32), and (33) are all purely forward-looking, it is natural to sup-
pose that the equilibrium from date T onward should be the zero-inflation steady 
state; hence, the equilibrium values will be  π	t 	=		 y	=	0,  i	t 	=		_	r  >	0 for all t	≥	T. 25 
Given this solution for the equilibrium from date T onward, we wish to determine 
the equilibrium evolution prior to date T. Equilibrium conditions (24), (32), and 
(33) can be “solved forward” to obtain a unique bounded solution if and only if the 
model parameters satisfy 
(34)	 κσμ	<	 (1	 −	 μ)(1	 −	 βμ).
Note that this condition holds for all 0	≤	μ	<		_	μ, where the upper bound  _	μ <	1 
depends on the model parameters (β, κ, σ). Here, I consider only the case in which 
(34) is satisfied, which is to say, in which it is not expected that the crisis is likely 
to persist for too many years. Then, since at each date t	<	T, the probability distri-
bution of future evolutions of fundamentals (the joint evolution of { r	t	net ,   G 	t }) is the 
same, the unique bounded solution obtained by “solving forward” is one in which 
π	t 	=		π	L ,   y	t 	=		 y	L ,  i	t 	=		i	L for each t	<	T, for certain constant values (	π	L ,  y	L ,  i	L ). 
These constant values can be obtained by observing that (24) requires that 
(35)	 	π	L 	 =	 	 κ	_	1	 −	 βμ		(  y	L 	 −	 Γ	 G 	L ),
and that (32) requires that 
(36)	 (1	 −	 μ)(  y	L 	 −	 	 G 	L )	=	 σ(−		i	L 	 +	 μ	π	L 	 +	 	r	L ).
25 One can show that this is a locally determinate rational-expectations equilibrium for dates t	≥	T, under the 
policies assumed; that is, it is the only solution in which inflation and output remain within certain bounded intervals.
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Using (35) to substitute for  π	L in (36), one obtains an equation that can be solved 
to yield 
(37)   y	L 	 =	 	ϑ	r ( r	L 	 −	 	i	L )	+	 	ϑ	G  G 	L ,
where 
(38)	 	ϑ	r ≡	 	 σ(1	 −	 βμ)		__	(1	 −	 μ)(1	 −	 βμ)	−	 κσμ	 >	 0,	 	
	 	ϑ	G ≡	 	(1	 −	 μ)(1	 −	 βμ)	−	 κσμΓ			___(1	 −	 μ)(1	 −	 βμ)	−κσμ	 	>	 1.
(Here, the indicated bounds follow from (34) and the fact that Γ	<	1.)
One can then substitute (37) and the associated solution for the inflation rate into 
(33) and solve the resulting equation for  i	L . The solution lies on the branch of (33),
where  i	L 	=	0 for values of   G 	L near zero if and only if 
(39)  _	r  +	 	(	 κ	_	1	 −	 βμ		ϕ	π	+	 	ϕ	y ) ϑ	r 		r	L 	 <	 0.
This is the case of interest here; assuming that  r	L is negative enough for (39) to hold, 
the zero lower bound will bind in the case that government purchases remain at 
their normal (steady-state) level.26 In fact, it will bind in the case of any   G 	L 	<		 G 	crit ,
where 
   G 	crit ≡	 	
	(	 κ	_	1	 −	 βμ	ϕ	π	+	 	ϕ	y ) ϑ	r (−		r	L )	−	 	_	r  
   __				 κ	_	
1	 −	 βμ	ϕ	π	(	ϑ	G 	 −	 Γ)	+	 	ϕ	y ϑ	G 
  >	 0.
For any level of government purchases below this critical level, equilibrium output 
will be given by 
(40)   y	L 	 =	 	ϑ	r r	L 	 +	 	ϑ	G  G 	L 
for all t	<	T, and the inflation rate will equal the value  π	L given by (35).
In this equilibrium, there will be both deflation and a negative output gap (out-
put below its level with flexible wages and prices), for as long as credit spreads 
remain elevated, in the case of any level of government purchases  G	L 	≤		G	crit . 27 The 
26 Note that if, as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), it is assumed that the central bank pursues a strict zero 
inflation target as long as this is consistent with the zero lower bound, then the zero lower bound necessarily binds 
at dates t	<	T if   G 	L 	=	0, as long as  r	L 	<	0. The values computed here for the multipliers d y	L /d r	L and d y	L /d G	L are 
the same under that simpler hypothesis.
27 As illustrated in Figure 1, output may nonetheless exceed its steady-state level; for the parameter values 
assumed in the figure,  y	L exceeds  _	y (so that   y	L 	>	0) for values of  G	L near  G	crit , though the output gap remains 
 negative, because the increased government purchases increase the “natural” level of output.
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deflation and economic contraction can be quite severe, for even a modestly nega-
tive value of  r	L , in the case that μ is large; in fact,  ϑ	r (the multiplier dy/dr plotted 
in Figure 2) becomes unboundedly large as μ approaches  _	μ. Under such circum-
stances, it can be highly desirable to stimulate aggregate demand by increasing the 
level of government purchases.
For levels of government purchases up to  G	crit , (40) implies that each additional 
dollar spent by the government increases gross domestic product (GDP) by  ϑ	G dol-
lars.28 Increases in government purchases beyond that level result in even higher levels 
of GDP, though the increase per dollar of additional government purchases is smaller, 
as shown in Figure 1, owing to the central bank’s increase in interest rates in accor-
dance with the Taylor rule. (Figure 1 plots   y	L as a function of   G 	L , for the numerical 
parameter values proposed by Eggertsson (2009).29 Under these parameter values, 
28 Note that this multiplier is calculated using approximations to the model structural equations that have been 
log-linearized around the zero-inflation steady state, as in Eggertsson (2009) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Rebelo (2009). However, the case considered here is necessarily some distance from that steady state, so the deriva-
tives used need not yield a correct multiplier. (The multiplier computed here is correct only in the case that  r	L is 
a sufficiently small negative quantity, so that  π	L and   y	L remain close to zero when   G 	L 	=	0.) R. Anton Braun and 
Yuichiro Waki (2010) find that log-linearization around the zero-inflation steady state can substantially exaggerate 
the size of the multiplier under realistic parameter values; but they still conclude on the basis of their nonlinear 
analysis that the multiplier is well above one.
29 Eggertsson (2009) chooses parameter values to fit the size of the contraction experienced by the US economy 
during the Great Depression. According to his modal parameter estimates (for a quarterly model), β	=	0.997, 
κ	=	0.00859, σ	=	0.862, and Γ	=	0.425. The shock required to account for the size of the contraction during 
the Great Depression is one under which  r	L 	=	−	0.010 (minus 4 percent per annum) and μ	=	0.903 (an expected 
mean duration a little over ten quarters); the response coefficients for monetary policy are assumed to be  ϕ	π	=	1.5, 












Figure 1. Output as a Function of the Level of Government Purchases during the Period in which 
Credit Spreads Remain Elevated
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G	crit is reached when government purchases exceed their steady-state value by 13.6 
percent of steady-state GDP.30) For values  G	L 	>		G	crit , the multiplier is no longer  ϑ	G , 
but instead the coefficient  γ	y defined in (31), where the persistence parameter ρ is now 
replaced by μ.31
It follows from (38) that the multiplier d y	L /d G	L 	=		ϑ	G for government purchases 
up to the level   G 	crit is necessarily greater than one (for any μ	>	0). The reason is 
that, given that the nominal interest rate remains at zero in periods t	<	T, an increase 
in  G	L , which increases  π	L , accordingly increases expected inflation (given some 
positive probability of elevated credit spreads continuing for another period), and 
so lowers the real rate of interest.32 Hence, monetary policy is even more accom-
modative than is assumed in the benchmark analysis in Section II, and the increase 
in aggregate output is correspondingly higher.
The degree to which the multiplier exceeds one in this case can, in principle, be 
quite considerable. In fact, for any given values of the other parameters, the multi-
plier, while the policy rate remains at the zero bound, can be unboundedly large, for 
a sufficiently large value of the persistence parameter μ. Figure 2 plots the multi-
plier as a function of μ, holding the other model parameters fixed at the values used 
by Eggertsson (2009). The figure illustrates something that can be observed from 
(38) to hold quite generally; the multiplier is monotonically increasing in μ, and 
increases without bound as μ approaches  _	μ. The figure also indicates that the multi-
plier is in general not too much greater than 1, except if μ is fairly large. However, 
it is important to note that the case in which μ is large (in particular, a large fraction 
of  
_	μ) is precisely the case in which the multiplier d y	L /d r	L is also large, which is to 
say, the case in which a moderate increase in the size of credit spreads can cause a 
severe output collapse.33
Thus, increased government purchases when interest rates are at the zero bound 
should be a powerful means through which to stave off economic crisis precisely in 
those cases in which the constraint of the zero lower bound would otherwise be most 
crippling—namely, those cases in which there is insufficient confidence that the 
disruption of credit markets will be short-lived. For example, in Eggertsson’s (2009) 
ϕ	y 	=	0.25. (The justification of these parameter values is discussed in greater detail in Matthew Denes and 
Eggertsson 2009.) Note that because I use a simpler model of the labor market in the current exposition, κ is not 
the same function of underlying parameters in (24) above as in Eggertsson’s (2009)	paper. Here, I parameterize 
the model so that the value of κ is the same as in Eggertsson’s (2009)	paper, meaning that implicitly the value of 
α is larger than the value assumed by Eggertsson (2009). The difference in the values assumed for α has no conse-
quences for the multiplier calculations discussed here.
30 In drawing Figure 1, I have also assumed that the credit spread is zero in the “normal” state, so that  
_	r  =	−	logβ. 
Allowing for a small positive credit spread in this state would raise the value of  G	crit .
31 Under Eggertsson’s (2009) parameter values, this quantity is equal only to 0.3. (Note that this is a case in 
which, when the central bank is not constrained by the zero bound, the multiplier under a Taylor rule that responds 
to detrended output is actually lower than the neoclassical benchmark; for under Eggertsson’s (2009)	parameter 
values, Γ	=	0.4.) Under the alternative hypothesis that the central bank implements a strict zero inflation target, 
except when prevented by the zero bound, the multiplier above the critical level of government purchases is equal 
to Γ. If, instead, the central bank follows a Taylor rule of the form (25), the multiplier beyond the critical level of 
government purchases is given by (30).
32 Note that the increase in expected inflation referred to here is actually a reduction in the expected rate of defla-
tion. For all levels of government purchases below  G	crit , the output gap remains negative (output remains below the 
flexible-price equilibrium level), and it is expected to be nonpositive in all future periods as well, so that a negative 
rate of inflation is implied by (24).
33 See Denes and Eggertsson (2009) for further discussion of this point.
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numerical example, a contraction of the size experienced during the Great Depression 
occurs as a result of a disturbance with a persistence coefficient of μ	=	0.903. In 
the case of this kind of disturbance, his parameter values imply a multiplier of 2.3. 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) similarly find that a multiplier above two 
is possible at the zero lower bound, in the context of a more complex New Keynesian 
model that is estimated to match a large number of features of postwar US data.
Evidence on the effects of defense spending during the 1930s suggest that substan-
tial multipliers of this kind may indeed be possible during circumstances like those of 
the Great Depression. For example, Miguel Almunia et al. (2010) estimate panel vec-
tor autoregressions (VARs) using data from 27 countries for the period 1925–1939, 
and look at the response to innovations in defense purchases, taken to represent exog-
enous changes in government purchases. Depending on the specification used, they 
find a multiplier during the year of the innovation of either 2.5 (their figure 14) or 2.1 
(their figure 19). Robert J. Gordon and Robert Krenn (2010) similarly find a multiplier 
greater than one for the effects of innovations in government purchases on US real 
GDP during the military buildup between 1940:I and 1941:IV. It is arguable that these 
relatively high multipliers for defense purchases during the Great Depression, relative 
to those found by studies of the effects of defense purchases at other times (e.g., those 
summarized in Hall 2009), reflect a greater degree of monetary accommodation under 
Great Depression circumstances than has been typical of other military buildups.34
34 In fact, the VAR results of Almunia et al. (2010) show central-bank discount rates being reduced, rather than 
increased, in response to a positive innovation in defense purchases.














Figure 2. Derivatives of  Y​L with Respect to the​Values of  r L and  G​L , for Alternate Degrees of 
Persistence μ of the Financial Disturbance
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B. importance of the duration of fiscal Stimulus
Cogan et al. (2010), instead, find that a leading empirical New Keynesian model 
of the US economy predicts small multiplier effects of increased government 
purchases during a situation in which the zero lower bound is assumed to bind. 
For example, when Cogan et al. (2010) consider the effect of a permanent increase 
in government purchases of 1 percent of GDP, they find an increase in GDP of 
only 1.0 percent in the first quarter, which falls to only 0.6 percent by the end 
of the second year (the period over which they assume that the federal funds 
rate remains at zero), and to only 0.4 percent after four years. In the case of an 
assumed path of government purchases intended to mimic projected expenditure 
under the February 2009 US federal stimulus package, their model implies an 
increase in GDP substantially smaller than the increase in government purchases 
in all quarters, and hence a particularly modest increase in output during the first 
year of their simulation.
What accounts for the difference with the large multiplier obtained at the zero bound 
by Eggertsson (2009)? While the empirical model used by Cogan et al. (2010) is sub-
stantially more complex, this is probably not the most important difference in their 
analysis.35 The crucial difference is that the calculations above assume an increase 
in government purchases that lasts precisely as long as credit spreads are elevated, 
and hence precisely as long as the zero lower bound is a binding constraint, follow-
ing which period  G	t 	=		_	G again each period. Cogan et al. (2010), instead, consider 
increases in government purchases that are initiated at a time when interest rates 
are zero, but that extend much longer than the period over which the interest rate is 
assumed to remain at zero.
In our simple model as well, the increase in output is predicted to be much smaller 
if a substantial part of the increased government purchases are expected to occur 
after the zero lower bound ceases to bind. For, as explained above, once interest 
rates are determined by a Taylor rule, a higher level of government purchases should 
crowd out private spending (raising the marginal utility of private expenditure), and 
may well cause lower inflation as well.36 But the expectation of a higher marginal 
utility of expenditure and of lower inflation in the event that credit spreads normal-
ize in the following period both act as disincentives to private expenditure while 
the nominal interest rate remains at zero. Hence, while there is a positive effect on 
output during the crisis of increased government purchases at dates t	<	T, an antici-
pation of increased government purchases at dates t	≥	T has a negative effect on 
output prior to date T.
A simple calculation can illustrate this. Suppose that, instead of the two-state 
Markov chain considered above, there are three states: after the “crisis” state (in 
which  r	t	net 	=		r	L and   G 	t 	=		 G 	L ) ends, there is a probability 0	<	λ	<	1 each period 
that government purchases will remain at their elevated level (	 G 	t 	=		 G 	L ), even 
35 The empirical model considered by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) has a structure very similar 
to the one used by Cogan et al. (2010), yet Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) obtain multipliers well in 
excess of one for a policy experiment similar to the one analyzed above.
36 Both things occur in the case of the Eggertsson (2009) parameter values explained in footnote 29.
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though  r	t	net 	=		_	r  , though with probability 1	−	λ each period the economy returns to 
the “normal” state (in which  r	t	net 	=		_	r  and  G	t 	=		_	G ) and remains there forever. If we 
let ( π	S ,   y	S ,  i	S ) be the constant values for ( π	t ,   y	t  ,  i	t ) in the transitional state (i.e., for all 
T	≥	t	<	T ′, where T ′ is the random date at which government purchases return to 
their “normal” level), then the value of  E	t  y	t+1 during the “crisis” period is not μ	 y	L , 
but μ	 y	L 	+	(1	−	μ)λ	 y	S , and similarly for expected future government purchases and 
expected future inflation. We can repeat the previous derivation, obtaining instead of 
(40) the more general form 
(41)   y	L 	 =	 	ϑ	r  r	L 	 +	 	ϑ	G   G 	L 	 +	 	ϑ	π		π	S 	 +	 	ϑ	c (  y	S 	 −	 	 G 	L ),
where 
	 	ϑ	π	≡	 (1	 −	 μ)λ	ϑ	r 	 >	 0,	 	 	ϑ	c ≡	 	σ	−1 ϑ	π	>	 0.
The fact that  ϑ	π	, ϑ	c 	>	0 indicates that an expectation of either lower private expen-
diture or lower inflation in the transitional state will lower output during the crisis.
Using the same reasoning as in the previous section, one can show that the lev-
els of output and inflation during the transitional state, when the interest rate is 
determined by the Taylor rule but government purchases remain high, are given by 
  y	S 	=		γ	y   G 	L ,  π	S 	=		γ	π		 G 	L , where  γ	y is the coefficient defined in (31) (but with the per-
sistence coefficient ρ equal to λ) and  γ	π	 is the corresponding inflation coefficient. 
One thus obtains a multiplier 
(42)  d y	L  _	
d G	L  =	 	ϑ	G 	 +	 	ϑ	π	γ	π	+	 	ϑ	c ( γ	y 	 −	 1)
for government purchases below the critical level that causes the zero bound to 
no longer bind even in the crisis state. Since  γ	y 	<	1 as explained earlier, the con-
tribution of the final term is necessarily negative. In the case that either of the 
response coefficients (	ϕ	π	, ϕ	y ) is sufficiently large, the Taylor rule will not allow a 
large increase in inflation during the transitional phase, and one obtains a multiplier 
smaller than  ϑ	G when λ	>	0. 
Figure 3 plots the value of the multiplier (42) as a function of λ, in the case that 
the other parameters take the values proposed by Eggertsson (2009). When λ	=	0, 
the multiplier is nearly 2.3, as reported by Eggertsson, but it steadily falls as λ is 
increased. For values of λ equal to 0.8 or higher (an expected duration of the fis-
cal stimulus for four quarters or more after the end of the financial disturbance), 
the multiplier falls below one. For values of λ equal to 0.91 or higher (an expected 
duration of ten quarters or more), the multiplier is negative. In particular, in the case 
of a permanent increase in the level of government purchases (the case λ	=	1), as 
in the first case considered by Cogan et al. (2010), the multiplier is strongly nega-
tive (nearly −5!). Hence a finding that a long-lasting fiscal stimulus is predicted to 
increase output only modestly, as in the simulations of Cogan et al. (2010), does not 
mean that a better-targeted fiscal stimulus cannot be much more effective.
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Nor is it the case that to be effective, the government spending must occur imme-
diately. In the model considered here, an increase in government purchases during 
a period in which the interest rate is zero, which is expected to last for the current 
quarter only, so that there is no change in expected future government purchases, has 
a multiplier of exactly one. (This is because with no change in expected future fiscal 
policy, there is no change in expected future output or inflation. This means no change 
in expected real interest rates in future periods, and, as long as the temporary increase 
in  G	t remains within the range that implies a current nominal interest rate of zero, no 
change in the current real interest rate either. Hence, the benchmark analysis in Section 
II applies.) It follows that when Eggertsson (2009) obtains a multiplier of 2.3, 1.0 of 
this is due to the increase in government purchases during the current quarter, while 
the other 1.3 is the effect of higher anticipated government purchases in the future.
Hence, even if there were no increase in government purchases in the current 
quarter at all, an expectation of higher government purchases in all future quarters 
prior to date T would increase output immediately by an amount that is 1.3 times 
as large as the promised future increase in the level of government purchases. Of 
course, an even longer delay would attenuate the effects on output at the time of the 
announcement to an even greater extent. Still, New Keynesian models certainly do 
not imply that a delayed fiscal stimulus will serve no purpose—as long as the even-
tual increase in government spending is contingent on the continued existence of 
the financial disruption that justifies the emergency measures. The kind of stimulus 
package that is ineffective, or even counter-productive, is one under which a large 
















Figure 3. Derivative of  Y​L with Respect to​GL , for Alternative Degrees of Persistence λ of Fiscal 
Stimulus after the End of the Financial Disturbance
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environment in which monetary policy is not expected to accommodate an increase 
in aggregate demand.37
V.  Government Purchases and Welfare
Thus far, I have simply considered the extent to which it is possible for an increase 
in government spending to increase aggregate output and employment, taking for 
granted (as in much popular discussion) that an increase in output would be desir-
able, at least under circumstances where output would otherwise be below its trend 
path. But it is reasonable to ask whether our models imply not only that increased 
government purchases will increase GDP, but that they will increase economic wel-
fare as well. This does not follow trivially from the existence of a positive multiplier 
(or even a multiplier greater than one); one must consider the value of the use to 
which the resources consumed by the government would otherwise be put.
A. fiscal Stabilization in the Neoclassical Model
In the case of the neoclassical model, it is evident that if government purchases 
are of no intrinsic value (“paying people to dig holes and then fill them again”), the 
optimal level of government purchases must be zero, for any government purchases 
crowd out private expenditure and increase the disutility of working. But, of course, 
some kinds of government spending do benefit the public; we can represent this by 
making the utility of the representative household depend on  G	t , the level of public 
goods provision. The calculations above are unaffected by this hypothesis, as long 
as we suppose that utility is additively separable in public goods (the tacit assump-
tion earlier).38 Let us suppose, then, that the utility of the representative household 




	 	β	t [u( c	t )	+	 g( G	t )	−	 v( H	t )],
where g′	>	0,  g″ 	≤	0. (Of course, the value of public projects does not depend solely 
on the amount that is spent on them. But it is an obvious principle of optimal fiscal 
policy that the projects financed should be those that yield the greatest additional 
utility per dollar spent; the function g(G) accordingly indicates the utility obtained 
in this case.)
Given that for any path { G	t } of government purchases, the competitive equilib-
rium will maximize the utility of the representative household, it is easily seen that 
the optimal path of government purchases will be the one that satisfies the first-order 
condition 
(44)  g′ ( G	t )	=	 	u′ ( y	t 	 −	 	G	t )
37 This is illustrated not only by the simulations of Cogan et al. (2010), but also by those of Erceg and Lindé 
(2010) for the case of a “gradual increase in government purchases” that continues beyond the point at which the 
zero bound ceases to bind.
38 For extension of the neoclassical theory to the case in which public goods are at least partially substitutes for 
private expenditure, see, e.g., Baxter and King (1993).
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each period. This condition has a simple interpretation: government purchases 
should be undertaken if and only if they have a marginal utility as high as that 
associated with additional private expenditure—i.e., if they satisfy the conven-
tional (microeconomic) cost-benefit criterion. One way of stating this criterion is to 
say that government purchases should be chosen so as to maximize u(	y	t 	−		G	t )	+	
g(	G	t ), taking as given the quantity of aggregate expenditure  y	t . (I shall call this the 
criterion of efficient composition of expenditure.) Plainly, this is not a criterion that 
requires one, in choosing whether to undertake a particular public project, to think 
about the consequences of government spending for aggregate demand.
B. fiscal Stabilization when Monetary policy is optimal
There is greater scope for fiscal stabilization policy in the case that prices or wages 
are sticky (or based on older information than that available to the government). If 
a recession is a time when output is below the full-information flexible-wage/price 
level, owing to stickiness of one sort or another, this implies a misallocation of 
resources, and a potential justification for fiscal stimulus to “fill the output gap.” If 
an increase in government purchases  G	t is associated with an increase in output  y	t 
that period (abstracting, for the moment, from changes in the allocation of resources 
in any other periods), utility will be increased if the relative size of the two changes 
satisfies the condition 
(45)	 ( u′ 	 −	 	˜  v′	)		dy _	dG  +	 ( g′ 	 −	 	u′ )	>	 0.
In the neoclassical case, equilibrium condition (6) implies that the first term in (45) 
is necessarily zero, so that increased government purchases increase welfare only to 
the extent that  g′ exceeds  u′ . But if during a recession,  u′ 	>		˜  v′, the condition can be 
satisfied even when  u′ exceeds  g′ to some extent; this will be more likely the greater 
the extent to which  u′ exceeds  ˜  v′ (i.e., the more negative the output gap), and the 
greater the multiplier effects of government purchases.
Yet it is important to remember that in New Keynesian models, both the size of the 
output gap and the size of the multiplier will depend on monetary policy; and while 
there might well be significant opportunities for fiscal stabilization policy under the 
assumption that prices, wages or information are sticky and that monetary policy is 
inept, the most obvious solution in such a case is to increase the accuracy of monetary 
stabilization policy. Indeed, given that effective monetary stabilization policy should 
prevent large variations in the ratio of  u′ to  ˜  v	′	 (by stabilizing the output gap), it is not 
obvious that the novel considerations mentioned in the previous paragraph should 
be of great quantitative significance when monetary policy is used optimally.
A case that is especially simple to analyze is that in which we suppose that there 
exists a constant employment or output subsidy, of precisely the magnitude necessary 
to offset the distortion owing to the market power of monopolistically  competitive 
producers.39 In this case, the factor μ	>	1 in (11) is canceled, and the equilibrium 
39 For example, it suffices that there be a subsidy equal to fraction τ of a firm’s payroll, where τ	=	1	−		μ	−1 	>	0, 
and μ	>	1 is the markup factor in (11).
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with (full-information) flexible prices and wages is efficient, despite the assumption 
of monopolistic competition. Now, suppose that prices are sticky (or set on the basis 
of sticky information), while wages are flexible (or there is efficient contracting in the 
labor market). A monetary policy that maintains price stability at all times achieves 
the (full-information) flexible-price equilibrium allocation, regardless of the path of 
government purchases, as discussed in Section IIIA; hence, this policy maximizes 
expected utility, given the path of government purchases.40 Thus, one may conclude 
that, regardless of the path of government purchases, an optimal monetary policy 
achieves the allocation of resources predicted by the neoclassical model.41 But then 
the condition for optimality of the level of government purchases is again simply 
(44), which is to say, the principle of efficient composition of expenditure.
It is not simply a matter of there being two instruments that can each, in principle, 
address the problem of an insufficient level of aggregate nominal expenditure, given 
the existing level of prices or wages, so that it does not matter which instrument is 
used for the job. Rather, to the extent that the problem can be solved using monetary 
policy, it is costless to do so, since monetary policy has no other aims to fulfill; 
whereas, while government spending can also be used to ameliorate the problem, 
this has a cost, since it requires the diversion of real resources to alternative uses. 
Whenever government purchases are used for aggregate demand management, there 
is a tension between this goal and the choice of government purchases so as to 
maintain an optimal composition of expenditure. Since there is no equally important 
conflict in the case of the use of monetary policy for aggregate demand manage-
ment, monetary policy should be used to the extent possible; and this should largely 
allow decisions about government purchases to be made from the standpoint of the 
optimal composition of expenditure.
C. fiscal Stabilization at the Zero Lower Bound
There is, however, one case in which a much stronger argument can be made for 
the usefulness of variations in government spending for stabilization purposes. This 
is when a financial disturbance makes it impossible for monetary policy to maintain 
price stability and a zero output gap at all times, as the required path for the policy 
rate would violate the zero lower bound. Under such circumstances, substantial dis-
tortions due to deflation and a large negative output gap can exist in equilibrium, 
even with a central bank that maintains a strict zero inflation target whenever this is 
consistent a non-negative interest rate. It can then be desirable to use government 
purchases to “fill the output gap,” at least partially, even at the price of distorting, to 
some extent, the composition of expenditure in the economy.
As an example, let us consider the welfare effects of fiscal stimulus in the two-
state example of Section IVA. Suppose that the central bank maintains a strict 
zero inflation target whenever this is possible, and a nominal interest rate of zero 
40 For a more formal presentation of this argument, see Woodford (2003, chap. 6, sec. 3.1).
41 This result depends on an assumption that the zero lower bound on interest rates does not prevent monetary 
policy from achieving its inflation target at some points in time. The importance of this caveat is made clear in the 
following section.
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whenever deflation is unavoidable;42 and let us consider only fiscal policies under 
which  G	t is equal to some constant  G	L for all t	<	T, and equal to  _	G for all t	≥	T, 
where  
_	G is the optimal level of government purchases under “normal” conditions, 
that is, the value that satisfies (44) when  y	t 	=		_	y . The analysis is simplified if we 
again assume the existence of a subsidy such that the flexible-price equilibrium allo-
cation would be optimal. In this case, the steady state with  y	t 	=		_	y and  G	t 	=		_	G rep-
resents an optimal allocation of resources, and the assumed monetary policy would 
be optimal in the event that credit spreads were to remain always modest in size, so 
that the zero bound were never a binding constraint. I wish to consider the welfare 
effects of increasing  G	L above the normal level  _	G , and the way in which the optimal 
choice of  G	L depends on the size and expected duration of the financial disturbance.
One can show that a quadratic approximation to the expected value of (43)43 var-
ies inversely with 
(46)  E	0 ∑	
t=0
∞
	 	β	t [ π	t	2 	 +	 	λ	y (  y	t 	 −	 Γ	 G 	t )	2 	 +	 	λ	g  G 	t	2 ] ,
where 
	 	λ	y ≡	 	κ	_	θ >	 0,	 	 	 	 	λ	g ≡	 	[		η	g  _		η	u  +	 1	 −	 Γ]	Γ		λ	y 	 >	 0,
and  η	g 	≥	0 is (the negative of) the elasticity of  g′ with respect to G, a measure of the 
degree to which there are diminishing returns to additional government expenditure. 
Here, the final two terms inside the square brackets represent a quadratic approxi-
mation to u(	y	t 	−		G	t )	+	g(	G	t )	−		˜  v(	y	t ), which would be the period contribution to 
utility if the prices of all goods were the same, as would occur with flexible prices or 
in an environment with complete price stability. The additional  π	t	2 term represents 
the additional welfare loss owing to an inefficient composition of the economy’s 
aggregate product as a result of price dispersion.
If the zero bound were never a binding constraint on monetary policy, the 
only constraint on feasible paths for the inflation rate and the output gap   y	t 	−	Γ	 G 	t 
would be (24), regardless of the path of {  G 	t }. Hence, optimal monetary policy would 
maintain a zero inflation rate and output gap at all times, reducing each of the first 
two terms inside the square brackets in (46) to their minimum possible values each 
period. The optimal path of government purchases would then be chosen simply to 
minimize the remaining term, by setting   G 	t 	=	0 each period. (This would achieve 
an optimal composition of expenditure, as it would result in  y	t 	=		_	y , G	t 	=		_	G each 
period.)
In the case considered here, however, the zero lower bound on interest rates pre-
cludes this first-best outcome. Under a policy in the family proposed above, the 
42 This corresponds to a limiting case of the policy considered in Section IVA, in which  ϕ	π	 is made unbound-
edly large.
43 See Woodford (2003, chap. 6, sec. 2) for the derivation.
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equilibrium is of the kind characterized in Section IVA. In any equilibrium of this 
kind, the objective (46) takes the value 
(47)  1 _	
1	 −	 βμ	[	π	L	2 +	 	λ	y (  y	L 	 −	 Γ	 G 	L )	2 	 +	 	λ	g  G 	L	2 ] .
The optimal policy within this family is therefore obtained by minimizing (47) with 
respect to   G 	L , taking into account the dependence of (	π	L ,  y	L ) on   G 	L implied by (35) 
and (40). The first-order conditions for the minimization of this quadratic objective 
subject to the two linear constraints can be uniquely solved for a linear solution, 
(48)   G 	L 	 =	−		 ξ(	ϑ	G 	 −	 Γ)	ϑ	r   __		ξ(	ϑ	G 	 −	 Γ	)	2 	 +	 	λ	g   	r	L 	 >	 0,
where 
	 ξ	≡	 (	 κ	_	1	 −	 βμ		)	2 	 +	 	λ	y 	 >	 0.
(This solution for the optimal value of   G 	L is necessarily positive, because  ϑ	G 	>	Γ 
and  r	L 	<	0.)
Figure 4 plots the optimal value of   G 	L /|	 r	L | defined by (48), for alternative values 
of μ, assuming the values for the model parameters β, κ, σ, Γ and θ proposed by 
Eggertsson (2009).44 For a given financial disturbance parameterized by ( r	L , μ), the 
optimal size of the increase in government purchases can be determined from the 
figure by observing the optimal ratio for that value of μ, and then multiplying by the 
value of |		r	L |. Thus, a value of two on the vertical axis means that if  r	L is equal to −4 percent per annum, it would be optimal to increase government purchases by an 
amount equal to 8 percent of GDP.
The optimal value is plotted under two different assumptions about the degree of 
diminishing returns to additional government expenditure. In case A, it is assumed 
that utility is linear in government purchases (	η	g 	=	0); this provides an upper bound 
for the degree to which it can be cost-effective to increase government purchases. In 
case B, it is instead assumed that  η	g 	=	4 η	u ; this corresponds to the case in which the 
marginal utility of government purchases decreases at the same rate (per percentage 
point increase in spending) as the marginal utility of private purchases, and private 
expenditure is four times as large as government purchases in the steady state. In 
this case, because of the diminishing returns to additional government purchases, 
the optimal increase in government spending is less for any given financial distur-
bance. For purposes of comparison, the solid line in Figure 4 also plots the level of 
government purchases that would be required to fully eliminate the output gap (i.e., 
keep output at the flexible-price equilibrium level) and prevent any decline in infla-
tion as a result of the financial disturbance. (This line also indicates the critical level 
44 In addition to the parameter values reported in footnote 29, it is now also assumed that θ	=	12.77.
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of government purchases at which the zero lower bound ceases to bind, given the 
central bank’s assumed policy.)
The figure shows that it is optimal to use discretionary (state-dependent) govern-
ment purchases to partially offset the decline in output and inflation that would oth-
erwise occur as a result of the financial disturbance. It should be noted, however, that 
it is not optimal to fully stabilize inflation and the output gap, despite the feasibility 
of doing so, because of the inefficient composition of expenditure that this would 
involve. In the case that the financial disturbance is not too persistent (μ	=	0.5 or 
less), the optimal increase in government purchases is only a small fraction of the 
increase that would be required to eliminate the output gap, if we assume dimin-
ishing returns to additional public expenditure similar to those that exist for pri-
vate expenditure. (The optimal fiscal stimulus would be even smaller if one were to 
assume even more sharply diminishing returns to public expenditure, or if one were 
to take into account the distortions involved in raising government revenues.) At the 
same time, the optimal size of fiscal stimulus can be quite substantial, and a large 
fraction of the size required for full stabilization of both inflation and the output gap, 
in the case that μ is large. In this case—when there is believed to be a substantial 
probability that the financial disruption will persist for years, and when a serious 
depression could result in the absence of fiscal stimulus—welfare is maximized by 
an aggressive increase in government purchases, of nearly the size required to fully 
stabilize inflation and the output gap.















Figure 4. The Optimal Value of  G​L /| r L |, for Alternate​Values of μ, under Two Different Assumptions 
about the Size of  η g
Notes: Case A:  η G​ = 0. Case B:  η G​ = 4 η	u . The solid line shows the value of   G​ L​/| r L​| required to maintain a zero output 
gap.
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VI.  Consequences of Distortionary Taxation
The analyses above have for simplicity assumed lump-sum taxation. This is 
clearly unrealistic, but because there is no necessary connection between a path 
of government purchases and the path of distorting taxes (of various types) used 
to finance it, a full analysis of the complications raised by taking into account tax 
distortions is not possible here. If increased government purchases are financed 
by an increase in a proportional tax on wage income or on consumption purchases 
(for example), the increased tax wedge will increase the real marginal cost of sup-
plying a given level of output (assuming flexible wages). In a neoclassical model 
(where real marginal cost can never differ from one in equilibrium), the increased 
tax distortion will lower equilibrium output, and may even negate the increase 
in equilibrium output that would occur with lump-sum taxation for the reason 
explained in Section I.
For example, in the case of financing entirely through a proportional tax  τ	t on 
sales revenues, condition (6) becomes, instead, 
(49)	 (1	 −	 	τ	t ) u′ ( y	t 	 −	 	G	t )	=	 	˜  v′( y	t ),
from which it follows that  y	t is a decreasing function of  τ	t , for a given level of  G	t . If 
u(c)	=	logc and a balanced budget is maintained each period (so that  τ	t y	t 	=		G	t ), 
equation (49) reduces to 
  y	t	−1 	 =	 	˜  v′( y	t ),
and it is easily seen that the solution for  y	t is independent of  G	t (so that the multiplier 
is zero). If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private expenditure is even 
smaller, the multiplier will even be negative. Thus, it might seem a serious omission 
to discuss the plausibility of a substantial government expenditure multiplier with-
out taking into account the effects of distorting taxes.
But here, again, the stickiness of prices and/or wages and the nature of the 
assumed monetary policy response make an important difference. In the bench-
mark case considered in Section II, where monetary policy is assumed to maintain 
a constant path for the real interest rate, taking account of tax distortions would not 
change the conclusion that the government expenditure multiplier is equal to one, 
as long as the change in fiscal policy is assumed not to change the long-run level of 
tax distortions (which would matter for the determination of  _	y and hence of  _	c ). If 
a temporary increase in government purchases requires a corresponding temporary 
increase in the tax rate applied to wage income, the increase in real marginal cost 
will imply that the monetary policy required to keep the real interest rate constant 
will be even more inflationary than in the case of lump-sum taxation.
For example, in the case of Calvo pricing, and again assuming a proportional 
sales tax and a balanced budget each period as in the example above, inflation will 
again be determined by (24), where Γ will now be the balanced-budget neoclassical 
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multiplier implied by (49). Under the constant-real-interest-rate policy, the multi-
plier will still equal one, so that   y	t 	=		 G 	t each period; but since the tax distortions 
reduce the size of Γ (for given preferences, technology, and steady-state level of 
government purchases), the implied increase in   y	t 	−	Γ	 G 	t will be greater than in the 
case of lump-sum taxation, and so the implied increase in inflation will be greater. 
(The multipliers implied by the hypothesis of a strict inflation target, or by monetary 
policy following a Taylor rule, will instead be lower in the case of the distorting tax, 
just as in the neoclassical model.)
In the case of an increase in government purchases while monetary policy is 
constrained by the zero lower bound, the multiplier would actually be increased if 
we assume that the increased government purchases are financed by a balanced-
budget increase in the tax rate on wage income. The reason is that the increase 
in the tax wedge makes the policy even more inflationary, for the reason just 
explained. But an increase in expected inflation during the period while the nomi-
nal interest rate is constrained to equal zero will mean that real interest rates fall 
even more than in the analysis in Section IV, resulting in an even greater increase 
in output.45
Thus, the main conclusions of the simple analysis above have not been exagger-
ated by abstracting from the effects of tax distortions. Even if the increase in gov-
ernment purchases must be financed entirely by an increase in a wage income tax, 
it remains the case that sticky prices and/or wages make multipliers greater than 
or equal to one possible; that a monetary policy that maintains the real interest rate 
constant is sufficient to ensure a multiplier of one; and that a multiplier greater 
than one (under certain circumstances, substantially greater) should be expected 
in the case of an increase in government purchases while monetary policy is con-
strained by the zero lower bound—though in the last case, an additional proviso 
is now required, that the increase in the wage income tax must also occur while 
interest rates remain at zero. Taking account of tax distortions further underlines 
the importance of the expected duration of “fiscal stimulus” in response to an 
economic crisis, already emphasized in the analysis above. To the extent that tax 
distortions (such as an increased tax on wage income) are expected to continue to 
be higher even after the zero lower bound ceases to be a binding constraint, then—
assuming that monetary policy is subsequently determined by a strict inflation 
target or by a Taylor rule, as above—this fact will further reduce expected output 
after credit spreads normalize, further increase the expected marginal utility of 
income at that time, and thus give households a motive to save more during the 
crisis. Policy expectations of this kind can therefore be highly counterproductive, 
as Drautzburg and Uhlig (2010) find in the context of a more complex, empirical 
New Keynesian model.46
45 See Eggertsson (2009) for a detailed analysis of the expansionary effects of certain kinds of tax increases 
when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound.
46 See, also, the discussion of the consequences of delayed financing through labor income taxation in Erceg 
and Lindé (2010).
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VII.  Conclusion
We may summarize our conclusions as follows. Under circumstances like those 
of the Great Depression—that is, when a disturbance to the financial sector results 
in insufficient aggregate demand even with the central bank’s policy rate at the lower 
bound of zero, and when there is feared to be a substantial probability of the con-
straint continuing to bind for years to come—standard models of the kind widely 
used in analyses of monetary stabilization policy imply that the government expen-
diture multiplier should be larger than one, and may be well above one. Moreover, 
in the case of the kind of (purely forward-looking) monetary policy assumed in the 
analysis above, we have found that not only is there a large effect on output of an 
increase in government expenditure under Depression-like circumstances, but up to 
a certain point an increase in government purchases will increase welfare as well. 
In the case of a sufficiently persistent disturbance (the case in which the zero bound 
can lead to a serious output collapse), the optimal increase in government purchases 
can be nearly as large as the increase that would be required to completely eliminate 
the “output gap,” i.e., to raise output to its flexible-price equilibrium level (which 
will itself be higher due to the temporary increase in government purchases). Hence, 
a case can be made for quite an aggressive increase in government purchases under 
such circumstances, even taking account of the increased tax distortions required in 
order to finance the increase in government purchases.
Nonetheless, under less extreme circumstances, the case for using variations in 
government purchases for stabilization purposes is much weaker. Even when the zero 
lower bound is a binding constraint, if the disturbance that causes it to bind is not 
expected to be too persistent, then even though the multiplier for increased purchases 
while the constraint still binds will be at least slightly greater than one, it need not be 
much greater than one; and the optimal increase in government purchases is probably 
only a small fraction of what would be required to “fill the output gap.” When mon-
etary policy is not constrained by the zero lower bound, there is a good case for leaving 
output-gap stabilization largely to monetary policy, and basing decisions about govern-
ment purchases primarily, if not entirely, on the principle of efficient composition of 
aggregate expenditure.
And, finally, even when the zero lower bound is a temporarily binding con-
straint on monetary policy, the case just made for fiscal stimulus while the con-
straint binds applies only to the case in which the increased government purchases 
will be terminated as soon as the constraint ceases to bind, and in which the tax 
increases required to finance them also occur while the constraint binds. Either 
an increase in government purchases that continues after monetary policy ceases 
to be constrained, or tax increases thereafter that may be required to pay off debt 
issued during the crisis, is likely—to the extent such a change in future fiscal pol-
icy is correctly forecasted, and intertemporal expenditure decisions are forward-
looking—to significantly reduce the stimulative effects of increased government 
purchases during the crisis, and a fortiori to reduce the net welfare gains from 
the policy. Hence, while a case for aggressive fiscal stimulus can be made under 
certain circumstances, such a policy must be designed with care if it is to have 
the desired effect. And, as is now widely understood in the context of monetary 
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stabilization policy, careful signalling about the likely direction of future policy is 
likely to be as important as current actions.
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